Adrian Niculescu v. Chrysler Credit Corporation : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2001
Adrian Niculescu v. Chrysler Credit Corporation :
Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
P. Bryan Fishburn; Fishburn & Associates; Gary R. Howe; Callister, Nebeker & McCullough;
attorneys for appellee.
Mark Besendorfer; attorney for appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Adrian Niculescu v. Chrysler Credit Corporation, No. 20010406 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3310
COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADRIAN NICULESCU, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
CHRYSLER CREDIT CORPORATION, 
Appellee. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
Case No. 20010406CA 
On Appeal from Judgment Entered by the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County 
Judges Anne Stirba and K.S. Cornaby 
MARK BESENDORFER, ESQ. 
942 East 7145 South Suite #A-102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 568-1833 
Fax: (801) 567-1052 
Attorney for Appellant 
Priority Classification 15 
FISHBURN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
P.BRYAN FISHBURN, ESQ. (#A4572) 
4505 South Wasatch Boulevard, Suite #215 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Telephone: (801) 277-3445 
Fax: (802) 277-0333 
CALLISTER, NEBEKER& McCULLOUGH 
GARY R. HOWE, ESQ. (#A1552) 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801) 530-7300 
Fax:(801)364-9127 
Attorneys for Appellee 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JAN - 4 2002 
Pauiette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADRIAN NICULESCU, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
CHRYSLER CREDIT CORPORATION, 
Appellee. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
Case No. 20010406CA 
On Appeal from Judgment Entered by the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County 
Judges Anne Stirba and K.S. Cornaby 
FISHBURN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
P.BRYAN FISHBURN, ESQ. (#A4572) 
4505 South Wasatch Boulevard, Suite #215 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Telephone: (801) 277-3445 
Fax: (802) 277-0333 
CALLISTER, NEBEKER& McCULLOUGH 
GARY R. HOWE, ESQ. (#A1552) 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
MARK BESENDORFER, ESQ. Telephone: (801) 530-7300 
942 East 7145 South Suite #A-102 Fax: (801) 364-9127 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 568-1833 Attorneys for Appellee 
Fax: (801) 567-1052 
Attorney for Appellant 
Priority Classification 15 
IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES 
The Appellee is Chrysler Credit Corporation, acting through its successor-in-
interest Chrysler Financial Company, LLC. Appellee is represented by P.Bryan 
Fishburn, Esq., FISHBURN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. and by Gary R. Howe, Esq., 
CALLISTER, NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH. Neither of the above counsel 
represent Chrysler Motor Corporation on the appeal, nor have they ever represented 
Chrysler Motor Corporation as Appellant asserts in his Brief at 2. Chrysler Motor 
Corporation was not served after the appellant Adrian Niculescu filed his Complaint 
twelve years ago, in 1989. Chrysler Motor Corporation did not enter an appearance 
below and is not a party to this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction exists pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-2(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
(1) Response to Appellant's Statement 
A. Appellant claims that he should have had the benefit of a more lenient 
standard of proof, as the result of an amendment to federal law after he filed his 
Complaint. A statute, as a general rule, cannot be applied retroactively to determine 
liability. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3. An issue, also, is preserved for appeal only if the 
issue was presented to the Trial Court and that court given the opportunity to consider 
it. Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson. Inc.. 815 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Utah 1991). The argument 
that Appellant now makes was not made to the Trial Court. 
B. Appellant claims that the Court erred in not entering a default judgment 
against Chrysler Credit Corporation, the sanction he sought for what he perceived to 
be a chronic failure to respond to his discovery. A trial court has broad discretion in 
selecting and imposing sanctions for discovery violations. Appellate review is limited 
to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Preston & Chambers, P.C. 
v. Roller. 943 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah App. 1997). 
C. Appellant claims that the Trial Court erred in finding that Chrysler 
Credit Corporation's 1987 report of a repossession was not the product of malice or an 
intent to injure Mr. Niculescu. Findings of Fact may be reversed on appeal only if the 
- 9 -
appellant can demonstrate they were clearly erroneous. Utah R.Civ. P. 52(a); 
Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball 786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990). An appellant who 
fails to first marshall those facts that would tend to support a trial court's findings 
cannot prove the findings to have been clearly erroneous. Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale. 783 P.2d 551 (Utah App. 1989). 
D. Appellant claims that the Trial Court erred in denying his post trial 
Motion for Relief, founded on Rule 60(b). A trial court's denial of a motion premised 
on Rule 60(b), Utah R.Civ.P., will not be disturbed or overruled absent an abuse of 
discretion. Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989). 
(2) Governing Law on Liability 
The liability of Chrysler Credit Corporation in this case is governed by 15 
U.S.C. §1681h(e). This statute preempts state common law claims for negligence 
when the context is reporting credit performance information to a consumer reporting 
agency. For Chrysler Credit Corporation to be liable to Niculescu based on its 1987 
report of a repossession, Niculescu must have proved that Chrysler Credit Corporation 
reported false information AND that its report was the product of malice or a willful 
intent to injure him. Id. Otherwise, it is immune. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from Third District Court, Civil No.89090611CV (Judges 
Leonard Russon, Anne Stirba1, Stephen Henriod, D.K. Cornaby, Bruce Lubeck). 
Mr. Niculescu filed this action against Chrysler Credit Corporation (hereafter 
"CCC") in 1989. Record ("R") at 1. The case was settled and dismissed with 
prejudice in 1992. Order of Dismissal, R.121 (Stirba, J). CCC paid Niculescu $1,500 
and agreed to amend and withdraw its earlier report of a repossession. R. 130-132. 
After a lapse of five years, Niculescu became convinced (CCC believes 
incorrectly) that CCC had not performed its promises under the Settlement 
Agreement. In electing his remedy, Niculescu (represented by counsel) in 1997 paid 
into Court the $1,500 he had received from CCC in 1992 and moved to set aside the 
prior Order of Dismissal. R. 124. His motion also prayed that the prior settlement 
agreement be set aside. IcL The subsequent Order entered November 12, 1997, R. 
139, set aside the settlement and Order of Dismissal, and resurrected Niculescu's 1989 
Complaint. At this juncture, CCC's alleged nonperformance of the 1992 settlement 
agreement became irrelevant and immaterial. 
On August 31, 1999, Niculescu moved to compel responses to Interrogatories, 
Document Requests, and Requests for Admission that he had earlier served on CCC. 
R.201. The Court granted the motion and ordered CCC to respond on or before 
!The case was assigned to Judge Stirba as early as September 1991. However, the 
case was tried before Judge Cornaby because of Judge Stirba's ill health. 
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October 8, 1999, with sanctions possibly to follow if it did not. R.217. CCC timely 
and fully complied with this Order, serving its responses on Niculescu by October 8, 
1999, as ordered. R.219, 254-270. The Court later confirmed that CCC had 
complied. R.518 (Exhibit "C" hereto). 
On October 27, 1999, CCC moved to dismiss certain of Niculescu's causes of 
action. The motion was granted by Order entered December 27, 1999. R.295-2992. 
The effect of this Order was to dismiss Niculescu's second and fourth causes of 
action, as well as most of the first identified in his 1989 Complaint. Remaining was 
Niculescu's third cause of action which he characterized as "intentional and malicious 
destruction of credit rating." The surviving parts of his first cause of action, Le. those 
comprised by paragraphs 3-4, 7-8, and 15, stated a similar claim predicated on the 
alleged "false" report of a repossession by CCC to a consumer reporting agency. The 
residue of Claim I stated a claim for negligent, as well as an intentional reporting of 
false information to a consumer reporting agency. 
On November 9, 1999, Niculescu filed a second motion to compel. R.249. 
CCC opposed this motion. R.282-285. Niculescu did not notice up this motion for 
decision. See R.518, 519 (Exhibit "C" hereto). 
On January 27, 2000, Niculescu served on CCC Requests for Admission. The 
Requests were served by mail. R.359-362. CCC responded thirty-two days later. 
2The motion and parties' memoranda on CCC's motion to dismiss are found at 
R.223-248, 271-278. In his Brief at 6, Appellant incorrectly refers to this as a 
motion for summary judgment. 
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R.363, 364, 372-379. Exhibit "B" hereto. As the Court later concluded, these 
responses were timely. R.518, 519 (Exhibit "C" hereto). 
On March 22, 2000, Niculescu filed a "Motion for Sanctions and to Enter 
Default." R. 365-400. He asked the Court to enter a default judgment against CCC 
for what he perceived to be a chronic failure to respond to his discovery. R.365. CCC 
opposed this motion. R.401-450. The judge found Niculescu's arguments to be 
without merit, R.518-521, and his motion for sanctions was denied, R.518 (Exhibit 
"C" hereto), 528. 
On April 11, 2000, CCC moved for leave to amend its original Answer. R.454. 
Its purpose in doing so was to plead as an affirmative defense a qualified immunity 
based on 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e), a provision of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.3 A copy 
of this Section is attached hereto as Exhibit "D". The Court granted CCC leave to 
amend. R. 735, 748. CCC's amended Answer is found at R. 741. 
On August 2, 2000, CCC moved for summary judgment. R.576. Niculescu 
opposed the motion and it was denied. R.735, 738. 
Prior to trial, the Court also ordered that the $1,500 that Niculescu had paid 
into Court as a condition to setting aside the earlier settlement and dismissal, be 
released and returned to CCC. R.748. 
3The memoranda in support of and in opposition to this motion are found at R. 
464-468, 503-506, 507-511. Although Niculescu opposed CCC's motion to 
amend, he now claims, ironically, that he pleaded a cause of action based on 15 
U.S.C. § 1681 in his 1989 complaint. Brief at 5. 
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Both parties filed Trial Briefs: CCC at R.765-801; Niculescu at R.849-853. 
Both submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, consistent with 
what each believed would be proven: CCC at R.839-848; Niculescu at R.762-764. 
Trial comprised two days, February 12-13, 2001. The case was tried to the 
bench, K.S. Cornaby presiding. Following the close of the evidence, Judge Cornaby 
ruled in favor of the defendant, Chrysler Credit Corp. Judge Cornaby explained his 
reasoning on the record. Transcript of Ruling. He also provided to CCC's counsel a 
copy of CCC's pre-trial proposed findings and conclusions which he had edited. 
R.839-848. He instructed CCC to make the changes he had directed and then 
resubmit them for signature and entry. Transcript of Ruling at 8. 
CCC made the changes and then on February 15, 2001 served on Niculescu the 
edited, still proposed Findings of Fact. R. 871. Niculescu did not object to the form 
of the proposed Findings within the time permitted by Rule 4-504, Utah Code Judic. 
Admin. He belatedly filed objections on March 8, 2001. 
The Findings and Conclusions were entered by the Court on March 11, 2001 
(Cornaby, J.). R. 862. None of Niculescu's objections were heeded. The Trial Court 
found, as fact, that Niculescu defaulted on his payment obligations under the retail 
installment contract assigned to CCC, see_ Findings 4, 11-13; that CCC in the ordinary 
course of business repossessed and sold the collateral that secured Niculescu's 
contractual obligations to CCC, Findings 13, 15-19; and that the reported 
repossession, in any event, was not with malice or the product of a willful intent to 
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harm Niculescu, Findings 20-23, 24-26. R.862-866. The Court concluded, among 
other things, that: Niculescu breached his contractual payment obligations to CCC 
(Conclusions of Law Nos. 1-2); that CCC, on Niculescu's default, was legally entitled 
to repossess and sell Niculescu's van (Conclusions Nos. 4-5); that CCC's 1987 report 
of a repossession was accurate (Conclusion No. 6); that Niculescu's claim against 
CCC was governed by 15 U.S.C. 1681h(e) (Conclusion No. 7); that Niculescu, in any 
event, had not proven that CCC's report was with malice or with intent to injure 
Niculescu (Conclusion No. 8); and that CCC was not liable to Niculescu (Conclusion 
14), R.862, 867-870. The Trial Court also was not persuaded that the damages about 
which Niculescu complained were proximately caused by the 1987 credit report of a 
repossession. Finding 28, R. 862, 867. In sum, and based on an analysis of the facts 
within the qualified immunity framework provided by federal law, the Trial Court 
held that CCC was not liable for the damages that Niculescu claimed were caused by 
CCC's allegedly false report of a repossession. A copy of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law are attached hereto as Exhibit MA". 
Judgment was entered a few days later, on March 28, 2001. R. 883. The 
Judgment (Cornaby, J.) dismissed with prejudice the remainder of Niculescu's claims 
and causes of action. The ten days after judgment saw no motions to amend findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, or the judgment itself. See, Utah Rules Civ. P.52(b), 59. 
Twenty-seven days after the judgment was entered, however, Niculescu filed what he 
called a "Motion for Relief." R.886. Ostensibly founded on Rule 60(b), the motion 
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asked the Court to amend and add to the Findings of Fact it had entered on March 11, 
2001. CCC opposed the motion, R.894-898, and it was denied, R. 909 (Lubeck, J.). 
Niculescu initiated this appeal by Notice filed with the Third Judicial District 
Court on April 26, 2001. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In March 1987, Niculescu purchased from Hinckley Dodge a new Dodge B150 
Van to use and operate as a taxi. CCC extended Niculescu the credit he needed in 
order to consummate his purchase. The Retail Installment Contract that Niculescu 
signed on March 11, 1987, which was assigned by Hinckley to CCC for value4, 
obligated Niculescu to pay CCC $24,861.60 (the total purchase price plus interest) in 
sixty (60) monthly installments of $414.36. Defendant's Trial Exhibit 1. Niculescu , 
a lawyer in Romania before he emigrated to the United States, understood that he was 
contractually obliged to repay the loan. Trial Transcript ("T") at 78-79. Niculescu 
gave CCC a security interest in the van to secure his repayment obligations. 
Defendant's Trial Exh. 1. Niculescu made no payments on his loan. T. 80, 247. 
Shortly after his purchase, Niculescu claimed he experienced an oil leak and 
other mechanical problems. He asked Hinckley to make repairs, but its service 
department allegedly was unresponsive. Niculescu says he tried to persuade Chrysler 
Motor Company to honor its warranty, but that it too, was unresponsive. 
4CCC purchased the installment sale contract on delivery of a check to Hinckleys 
equal to the purchase price for the vehicle. T. 188-190, 247. 
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Having driven the van over 5,000 miles and earned $2,000 using it as a taxi for 
three weeks, Niculescu unilaterally returned the van to Hinckley. T. 87-88; 
Defendant's Trial Exh. 6, p.2; Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 27. 
About May 19, 1987, CCC's Bountiful office discovered that Niculescu had 
left the van with Hinckley and declared that he intended not to repay his loan. T.41-
42, 87-88, 165. Niculescu in fact never repaid any of the money he borrowed to 
purchase the van. T.80, 247. CCC picked up the van and took possession. It mailed 
to Niculescu a written notice disclosing (1) its possession of the vehicle and (2) its 
intent to sell it on or after May 29, 1987. Defendant's Trial Exhibit 2. The Notice 
stated the amount owed, $18,236.07, and advised Niculescu of his right to redeem the 
vehicle. Niculescu did not respond to this letter. T.128, 253-254. On June 29, 1987, 
CCC's Arleen Bedingfield mailed Niculescu a Deficiency Notice, which indicated 
that $6,036.07 remained owing on his account after the sale of his van. Defendant's 
Trial Exh. 3. The letter invited Niculescu to contact CCC to work out a payment 
schedule and "reestablish [his] good credit rating." Again, Niculescu did not respond. 
T. 128, 254-256. In the course of this process, in the regular course of its business, 
CCC reported a repossession. T.191, 263. The report was accurate. 
Niculescu, represented by counsel, filed suit against Chrysler Motor 
Corporation in United States District Court (Sam, J.) on September 1, 1987. 
Defendant's Trial Exh. 5. He asserted causes of action based on breach of warranty, 
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and negligent manufacture. Jd- He 
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alleged damages in the amount of $250,000; the same quantum of damages, 
incidentally, that he alleged in this case (which in this case he alleges resulted from a 
negative report by CCC concerning his credit). He did not ask to rescind his 
purchase.5 He did not join CCC as a defendant. T.l 19. There was no adjudication of 
the warranty and related claims as the lawsuit was settled.6 The case based on vehicle 
defects, thus, was settled on Niculescu's receipt of a sum of money.7 That settlement 
resulted in the release of all claims by Niculescu against Chrysler Motor Corporation 
and the dealer that sold him the van, Hinckley Dodge. See Defendant's Trial Exh. 6, 
p.6. 
After Niculescu's quest for $250,000 damages against Chrysler Motor 
Corporation failed, he turned on Chrysler Credit Corporation. 
Prior to trial, and at trial in this case, Niculescu complained that CCC's 1987 
report of a repossession had ruined his life and destroyed his business. He claimed it 
had caused the denial of vehicle loans in 1987 and 1989. Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 24, 
5Niculescu might have sought to rescind under Utah's "lemon law" statute, which 
applies to new vehicles, Utah Code Ann. § 13-20-1 et seq. He might also have 
rejected the vehicle, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-602, or revoked acceptance, id_ § 
70A-2-606, 608. 
6Judge Sam, however, in a Ruling dated January 26, 1990 observed that 
"[Niculescu] admitted he had no evidence to show Chrysler carelessly and 
negligently manufactured the van." Defendant's Trial Exh. 6, p.2. 
7Niculescu tried to renege on this settlement and took an appeal versus Chrysler 
Motor Coiporation to the Tenth Circuit before the dispute was finally concluded. 
Niculescu's appeal was denied. Niculescu v. Chrysler Motors Corporation (10th 
Cir., Case No. 90-4018). 
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25; also received as Defendant's Trial Exhibits 8 and 9. He claimed he could not 
thereafter borrow from major banks; that he was forced to pay 525% annual interest 
on borrowed funds. He claimed he could not readily obtain credit. According to 
Niculescu, the 1987 report of a repossession had a "snowball effect" with adverse 
credit effects up to the present time. According to Niculescu, " . . . all the problem I 
got for ten years because of repossession I guess still and increase every day." T. 129. 
Niculescu offered as exhibits denials of credit dated 1997 by First Card, Plaintiffs 
Trial Exh. 27; by Murdock Chevrolet, Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 28; and by Bank of 
America, Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 29. According to Niculescu, these exhibits proved the 
direct and everlasting impact caused by the 1987 report of a repossession. 
Niculescu's perception of "facts" and his selective recounting of them to this 
Court, however, do not coincide with the whole of the evidence that the Trial Court 
received. CCC's report of a repossession, or voluntary surrender,8 first, could have at 
most continued to be reported only seven years after the date of first report. T.178; 15 
U.S.C. § 1681c. The 1987 denial of credit by Commercial Credit Plan, Inc. was 
because Niculescu had inadequate income, not because of a reported repossession by 
CCC. "Derogatory credit information" was not checked as a reason for credit denial. 
Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 26. The 1989 denial of credit by GMAC did list a reported 
8According to CCC, it reported a voluntary surrender rather than a repossession. 
T.193, 196, 249-250. However, these events are both coded as an "1-8" in reports 
to consumer reporting agencies. T.161-162. CCC conceded that the difference in 
reporting a voluntary surrender and a repossession is insignificant. T.218, 249-
250. 
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repossession as a reason for credit denial, but it was only one of four reasons. 
Plaintiff's Trial Exh. 24. Niculescu had a second repossession subsequent to 1987, 
which undoubtedly impaired his credit and which was revealed only on cross-
examination. T. 106-107. 
The 1997 denials of credit could not have been based on the 1987 report, 
because reports of negative credit performance drop off after 7 years. In fact, a 1996 
TRW credit bureau report for Niculescu obtained by CCC in the course of discovery 
no longer showed the 1987 CCC report of repossession. Defendant's Trial Exh. 14; 
see also Defendant's Trial Exh. 31. When pressed, Niculescu "guessed" that the 1997 
credit denials were "because too many bills and not enough income." T.l 12. CCC, 
furthermore, deleted the report of the repossession by no later than November 1993 
(pursuant to the settlement agreement that Niculescu later rescinded). Defendant's 
Trial Exh. 4, T.182-183,193-197. 
Contrary to Niculescu's initial testimony, major banks did extend him credit: 
Zions Bank (1992 loan for $2,172 at 12 1/2% interest), T. 106, Defendant's Trial Exh. 
12; First Security Bank (car loan), T.109; Utah Bank & Trust (1991 car loan), T. 110. 
The evidence indicated that he was also extended credit by Phillips Petroleum, 
Commercial Credit, Beneficial Finance, Metropolitan Finance Co. (1995), University 
of Utah Credit Union (1992), Texaco (1991), and Norwest Credit (issuance of credit 
card). T. 108-110. Moreover, in 1997, Ford Motor Credit financed Niculescu's 
purchase of a new Ford Windstar Van. T. 110-111. By October 2000, Niculescu 
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reported monthly earnings of $2,434 (equaling an annual income of $29,208) and his 
wife $1,386 (equaling an annual income of $16,632). Defendant's Trial Exh. 15. 
If Niculescu ever in fact borrowed money at 525% annual interest, there was no 
documented proof of that evidenced at trial. 
Niculescu's belief that CCC deliberately set out to destroy him and his business 
by its report of repossession in 1987, a paranoia he reveals to this Court in his Brief, 
likewise was not supported by the evidence at trial. Niculescu borrowed from CCC 
$17,707.06 to purchase a van from Hinckley's. CCC in fact paid that very sum to 
Hinckley's. T. 188-189. Niculescu repaid none of the money he had borrowed. 
T.247. Instead, he unilaterally decided that he shouldn't have to repay it and returned 
the van to the dealer with the message that he would not be making payments. CCC 
took possession of the van as it was the collateral/security for Niculescu's obligation 
to repay. CCC followed regular procedure in taking possession of the van, giving 
notice, selling it at auction, and later reporting a repossession. T.193, 263. In a 
Notice dated June 29, 1987, Defendant's Trial Exhibit 3, CCC advised Niculescu that 
a deficiency of $6,036.07 remained after sale of the van and asked him to contact 
CCC's Bountiful office, and offered to work with him in reestablishing his credit. 
Niculescu did not respond. T.96, 254-256. Although CCC could have sued Niculescu 
for the deficiency, it did not. T.96, 190, 255, 258. 
- 2 1 -
Niculescu never proved a motive why CCC's report of repossession or 
voluntary surrender would be the product of malice. Niculescu knew no one in CCC's 
Bountiful office or otherwise in its employment who had a grudge or vendetta against 
him. T. 133-134. According to CCC's employees with knowledge of the Niculescu 
account, the report of a repossession was not motivated by malice, ill will, hatred, or 
an intent to injure Mr. Niculescu, T.190-191, 256-257; but was reported because it 
was an accurate description of what happened, T. 191-193. In the fourteen years that 
Jon Cassel worked at CCC's Bountiful office, he testified he knew of no instance 
where a report of repossession was motivated by malice or an intent to injure. T.192. 
Niculescu tells this Court that he wrote letters of protest concerning his 
complaints about the van, which CCC did not heed. First, none of those letters were 
in evidence and their content, thus, is unknown. Second, there was no evidence that 
the "protest letter" to CCC was ever received, as Niculescu mailed it to a lock-box 
payments-only address in California notwithstanding instructions in his payment book 
that the California address was an address for receipt of payments only. T.83-84, 165-
167, 246, 253-254. As previously noted, he ignored CCC's invitation to contact it for 
the purpose of addressing the deficiency and re-establishing credit. T.96, 255-256. 
Although Niculescu tells this court that there were other ways in which CCC 
could have handled and reported his credit performance, he does not explain 
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how.9 CCC's representatives explained that its reporting was governed by uniform 
procedures; that it reported performance on every loan and on every credit 
performance event. T.192-193. Furthermore, it was not within CCC's prerogative to 
forward borrowers' explanations or rationalizations as to why they chose not to repay 
a loan. T. 177-178. Such explanations, however, can be presented by a borrower to 
consumer reporting agencies. Niculescu might have conveyed to a consumer 
reporting agency his belief that CCC's report of a repossession was inaccurate, which 
would have required the agency to investigate his complaint. T.177; 15 U.S.C. § 
1681i(a). But he did not. Niculescu might also have compelled the inclusion in any 
subsequent credit report his explanation of his disagreement with CCC. 15 U.S.C. 
§1681i(b). Paradoxically, Mr. Niculescu did neither of these things, despite his belief 
that his refusal to repay his loan was legally justified, understandable, and excusable. 
T.121. 
SUMMARY OF APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS 
I. Chrysler Credit Corporation's liability is governed by 15 U.S.C. 
9Niculescu claims that CCC's Jon Cassell finally conceded that CCC could have 
reported the repossession of collateral differently than it did. Brief at 10. This 
conclusion, however, is not correct. Cassell was commenting (at R.217-218) on 
the different ways that two credit bureaus had interpreted CCC's report of a 
voluntary surrender of collateral: one, CBI, called it a "return of purchase"; 
another called it a "repossession." Even if there was more than one way for CCC 
to have reported the repossession of collateral, it does not follow that the manner 
in which CCC reported it was malicious and calculated to injure Mr. Niculescu. 
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§1681h(e), a provision in the Fair Credit Reporting Act. This section preempts state 
common law claims for negligence. It also cloaks persons who report credit 
performance information to a consumer reporting agency with a qualified immunity. 
For CCC to in incur liability to Niculescu for its 1987 report of a repossession, 
Niculescu must have proved that the report (1) was false AND (2) that it was 
furnished with malice or a willful intent to injure him. 
II. Chrysler Credit Corporation's 1987 report of a repossession was not 
false or inaccurate. Niculescu defaulted on his retail installment contract with CCC by 
declaring that he intended not to repay his loan and, then, by failing to make the first 
payment when it became due. Niculescu repaid none of the money he borrowed. 
Niculescu gave CCC a security interest in the van he purchased in order to secure his 
repayment obligations. On his default, CCC was legally entitled to repossess its 
collateral and sell it. Its subsequent report of a repossession was factually and legally 
correct. 
III. Appellant claims that he should have had the benefit of a more lenient 
standard of proof, as a consequence of an amendment to federal law that he says 
occurred after he filed his Complaint in 1989. First, this is an argument raised for the 
first time on appeal; never presented to the Trial Court. Second, Niculescu does not 
identify the alleged amendment, nor explains exactly how he thinks it should have 
helped him. Third, CCC's liability in any event would be governed by the law as it 
existed in 1987. 
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IV. The Trial Court's pretrial refusal to enter a default judgment was not 
error, for the reasons summarized by Judge Anne Stirba in a Minute Entry dated May 
19, 2000. On appeal, Niculescu changes the focus of his argument from alleged 
dilatory tactics (which is what he emphasized to the Trial Court) to, almost 
exclusively, a Rule 36 argument. His argument on Rule 36 warrants neither reversal 
of the judgment or remand, as he contends. Niculescu's argument fails for several 
reasons. First, the failure to timely respond to requests for admission does not, in any 
event, warrant entry of a default judgment. Second, CCC's responses to Niculescu's 
January 2000 Requests were timely as they were within the thirty allowed days plus 
the extra three allowed for mailing. Third, Niculescu failed to include in his Requests 
the mandatory cautionary language required by the second sentence of Rule 36(a)(1). 
Finally, Niculescu never introduced as evidence at trial any of the "facts" that he now 
claims on appeal should have been deemed admissions. Even now he does not 
identify the "facts" that he contends were established by operation of Rule 36. Nor 
does he explain how "facts" allegedly deemed so by Rule 36 clearly demonstrate that 
the Court's Findings of Fact were erroneous, having first marshalled those facts in 
support of the Findings. 
V. Appellant fails to marshall any of the evidence at trial that would 
support the Trial Court's finding that CCC's reported repossession was not the 
product of malice or an intent to injure Niculescu. Given Niculescu's failure to 
marshall the evidence, he cannot establish on appeal that the Court's Findings were 
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clearly erroneous; the standard of review dictated by Rule 52(a), Utah R.Civ.P. 
VI. The Trial Court did not err in denying Niculescu's post-trial Motion for 
Relief, by which he asked that the Court's Findings of Fact be amended pursuant to 
Rule 60(b). His request to amend findings of fact came too late. A Rule 60(b) motion 
cannot be used to circumvent the 10 day limitation contained in Rule 52(b) for seeking 
amendment of findings. 
VII. Niculescu should not be heard to complain that the Trial Court erred by 
failing to state in its findings of fact that CCC breached the 1992 Settlement 
Agreement and by failing to identify and quantify damages caused by the breach. 
When Niculescu (rightly or wrongly) became convinced in the mid 1990's that CCC 
had not performed under the Settlement Agreement, he elected to rescind the 
Settlement Agreement and revive the civil Complaint he filed in 1989. On 
Niculescu's rescission of the Settlement Agreement, he forfeited any claim he had for 
breach of that agreement. 
VIII. The exhibit attached to Appellant's Brief as "C" has no relevance to any 
issues on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant in his Brief articulates four claims of alleged error. Brief at 11-18. 
Before addressing Appellant's arguments, however, Appellee makes two points of its 
own. 
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First, liability for reporting to a consumer reporting agency is, and was in 1987, 
governed by 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e). This federal statute preempts state law. It 
provides qualified immunity to one who reports credit performance information to a 
consumer reporting agency. It is the applicable law to which the Trial Court looked to 
determine if CCC was liable to Mr. Niculescu given his allegations and proof. This 
statute provides the legal context against which the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law must be examined. 
Second, CCC contends that its 1987 report of a repossession was accurate and 
correct. This is an important point because if the information it reported in 1987 
concerning the status of Niculescu's loan was accurate, then there can be no claim by 
Niculescu against CCC for reporting false information. If CCC's report was accurate, 
the discussion of whether its reporting and conduct was negligent or malicious is 
immaterial. This second point is also discussed below. 
Once the preceding two points are addressed, CCC will address the four 
claimed points of error in the order raised by Mr. Niculescu in his Brief. It will then 
address two miscellaneous points at least implied by Niculescu's Brief. 
I. Federal Law Immunizes Persons who Report Credit Performance 
Information to Consumer Reporting Agencies, Unless It is Proven 
that the Reported Information was False AND was the Product of 
Malice or a Willful Intent to Injure, 
Once the Trial Court granted CCC leave to amend its Answer to assert a 
Section 1681h(e) based affirmative defense, Niculescu thereafter conceded that his 
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burden was (1) to prove that CCC's 1987 report of a repossession was false and (2) 
that this false information was furnished with malice or willful intent to injure him. 
See Niculescu's Trial Brief at R.851; Opening Argument at Trial, T.l 1. 
Title 15 U.S.C. §1681h(e) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") provides 
that: 
"no consumer may bring any action or proceeding in the nature of 
defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence with respect to the reporting 
of information against any consumer reporting agency, any user of 
information, or any person who furnishes information to a consumer 
reporting agency • . . except as to false information furnished with malice 
or willful intent to injure such consumer," [Emphasis added]. 
Section 1681h(e) expressly protects persons who furnish credit performance 
information to a consumer reporting agency.10 "No doubt the statutory immunity was 
put in place to encourage entities to report credit information without fear of being 
sued." Laracuente v. Laracuente. 599 A.2d 968, 971 (N.J. Super 1991). Thus, § 
1681h(e) shields persons such as CCC who report credit information to consumer 
reporting agencies unless it is proven that "false information" was reported and that 
the false information was "furnished with malice or willful intent to injure such 
consumer." Nikou v. INB National Bank, 1994 Ind. App. LEXIS 950 (Section 
1681h(e) cloaks sources of information with qualified immunity); Laracuente, supra 
FCRA defines a consumer reporting agency as any person who, for a fee, 
regularly engages in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit 
information for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties. 15 
U.S.C. § 1681a(f). Experion, Equifax, and TransUnion are examples of consumer 
reporting agencies. 
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(retail merchants who provide information to credit reporting agencies are immune 
from suit under the Act where negligence is alleged absent any assertion of malice); 
see also Mitchell v. Surety Acceptance Corporation, 838 F.Supp. 497, 501 (D.Colo. 
1993) (holding that, "No defamation action is allowed under the FCRA unless it is 
alleged that the defendant acted with malice or willful intent to injure the plaintiff). 
This section of FCRA preempts state common law causes of action for negligence or 
defamation unless malice or willful intent to injure is proven. Harper v. TRW. Inc., 
881 F.Supp. 294, 298 (E.D. Mich. 1995); Grant v. TRW, Inc.. 789 F.Supp. 690, 693 
(D.Md. 1992); Laracuente. supra at 971. 
The terms "malice" and "willful intent to injure," as used in § 1681h(e) are 
defined terms under federal case law: 
While the term "willful" is not defined under the FCRA, it has 
been interpreted in this context as requiring a showing that 
the agency " 'knowingly and intentionally committed an 
act in conscious disregard for the rights of others." 
Wiggins. 848 F.Supp. at 219 (citing Stevenson v. TRW. Inc.. 987 
F.2d 288, 293, 294 (5th Cir. 1993)). Courts considering what 
constitutes "malice" under this section have borrowed the 
meaning of the term used in the context of libel litigation, see 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 
710, 725-26, 11 L.Ed. 2d 686 (1964); in other words, an allegedly 
defamatory statement will be deemed to have been made 
with malice if the speaker knew it was false or acted with 
reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. See, e.g., Thornton 
v. Equifax. Inc.. 619 F.2d 700, 705 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 449 
U.S. 835, 101 S.Ct. 108, 66 L.Ed. 2d 41 (1980); Wiggins. 848 
F.Supp. at 223 & n. 17. 
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Whelan v. Trans Union Credit Reporting Agency, 862 F.Supp. 824, 833 (E.D. N.Y. 
1994) [emphases added]. 
The Trial Court Judge, however, adopted a definition of "malice" which he 
disclosed was one of several he had found in sources he did not disclose. The 
definition set forth by the Trial Court was: 
Malice in law is not necessarily personal hate or ill will, but is 
that state of mind which is reckless of law and the legal rights of 
the citizens. 
Transcript of Ruling, at 1. If anything, the Trial Court adopted as its definition of 
"malice" an easier-to-meet standard than that embraced by federal courts interpreting 
§ 1681h(e). The Trial Court, it appears, "set the bar" lower than it should have. Even 
so, the Court found that Niculescu did not prove that CCC's report of a repossession 
was the product of malice or a willful intent to injure him. Findings of Fact 20, 22, 
24-26. R.866. 
Under 11 U.S.C. § 1681h(e), Niculescu had to do more than prove that CCC 
negligently reported incomplete or inaccurate information to a consumer reporting 
agency. The statute preempts a claim by Niculescu under Utah common law, unless 
he can prove that CCC reported false information and did so with malice or an intent 
to injure him. Niculescu proved neither element. 
II. CCC's 1987 Report of a Repossession was Accurate. 
When Niculescu sometime in April 1987 declared to Hinckley Dodge that he 
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intended to repay none of the money he had borrowed to purchase the van, he effected 
an anticipatory repudiation of his contract obligations to CCC and, thus, breached 
them. See Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86 (Utah 1992). The breach was 
confirmed on April 25, 1987 when he failed to make his first monthly payment, when 
due. In fact, he made none of the sixty monthly payments that by contract he was 
supposed to make. 
Niculescu gave CCC a security interest in the van to secure his repayment 
obligations. Finding of Fact 4c; Defendant's Trial Exh. No. 1. On his default, CCC 
was entitled to take possession of the van (as it did about May 19, 1987) and after 
appropriate notice sell it, with the proceeds to be credited against Niculescu's debt. 
Findings of Fact 4c, 4g, 15-18, 26; Conclusions of Law 2-5. It was entitled to do so 
by contract. See Defendant's Trial Exh. 1 at Section F. Likewise, repossession and 
sale of collateral following a debtor's default is a statutory remedy to which a secured 
creditor is entitled. Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-503 (secured party's right to take 
possession of collateral after default) and §70A-9-504 (secured party's right to dispose 
of collateral after default). Repossession, thus, was part of CCC's authorized remedy 
on Niculescu's breach of contract. 
It was not error for CCC to report a repossession, as the Trial Court concluded. 
If the Court of Appeals agrees, this should end the analysis of whether liability exists 
for false credit information reported by CCC. 
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III. Appellant's First Claim of Error Is Without Merit. 
Appellant's first claim of error is particularly confusing as it is without 
reference to the record. He states that: 
at the time of ruling on the motion, the law [15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e)] had been 
amended to allow claims for negligence. Since the Appellant's motion was 
granted, and the Appellant's claims were of an ongoing nature . . . , he should 
have been allowed the benefit of the new standard, at least as far as damages 
occurring after the effective date of the amendment. 
Brief at 11. 
As a threshold matter, Appellant does not establish that the applicable Section 
1681h(e) was ever amended in the time period between October 6, 1989 (the date he 
filed his Complaint) and February 12-13, 2001 (date of trial).11 There is no citation to 
any place in the record where Niculescu argued to the Court that he be "allowed the 
benefit of [a] new standard," or what that "new standard" might be. To Appellee's 
recollection, such an argument was never made to the Trial Court. Arguments not 
made to a Trial Court generally will not be considered for the first time on appeal. 
Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Utah App. 1991). 
Second, it is not clear to what "motion" Appellant refers. As Appellant refers 
to "Appellant's motion," CCC assumes that he is referring to the motion he filed in 
August 1997 to set aside the earlier dismissal (R. 123-125). However, it is Niculescu 
11
 As a matter of fact, there was a 1996 amendment. That amendment added 
language not relevant to this analysis. It most certainly did not authorize lawsuits 
for merely negligent reporting of false credit information. 
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who elected to revive the deficient complaint he filed in 1989. Nonetheless, he could 
have thereafter moved to amend his Complaint to make it comport with "amended" 
statutory law, if there was any reason to do so. However, he did not. 
The lens through which this case focused on 15 U.S.C. f 1681h(e) was CCC's 
motion for leave to amend its Answer. R.454-468. The motion, which was granted 
(R.524-526), sought leave to add as an affirmative defense the qualified immunity 
established by §1681h(e). Although Niculescu opposed the motion to amend, R.503-
505, he did not do so on the grounds now stated in his Brief at 11. 
At no time, either before trial or at trial, did Niculescu ever argue that there was 
some alternative and more lenient standard to which he should be held, established by 
statutory amendment. Even had there been an amendment, the law in effect in 1987 
when CCC reported a repossession is the law that would govern its potential liability. 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3; Foil v. Ballinger. 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979) (quoting 
Okland Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 520 P.2d 208 (Utah 1974)). 
IV. The Trial Court's Pre-Trial Refusal to Sanction Chrysler Credit 
Corporation and Enter a Default Was Not Error. 
Throughout the pretrial phase, Niculescu sought to have the Trial Court default 
CCC for what he perceived to be discovery abuses. A chronology of his efforts in this 
regard are succinctly summarized by the Court (Hon. Anne M. Stirba) in a Minute 
Entry (May 19, 2000) at R.518 (Exhibit "C" hereto). 
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The Minute Entry explains why Niculescu's complaints were misguided and 
why his requests for sanctions not well founded. R.518-520; see also Order Denying 
Niculescu's "Motion for Sanctions and to Enter Default" at R. 528-530. According to 
the Court, CCC timely complied with its Order to Compel entered on September 29, 
1999 and timely responded to Niculescu's requests for admission and other discovery 
served in January 2000. 
Niculescu's pretrial request for sanctions was made to the Trial Court by 
Motion/ Memorandum dated March 22, 2000. R.365-400.12 CCC's opposition 
memorandum is found at R. 401-450 and Niculescu's Reply at 471-502. The relief 
Niculescu sought was entry of a default judgment, "based upon the total lack of good 
faith handling of this matter by the defendant" and conduct that he thought "willful 
and wanton" which demonstrated "willfulness, bad faith or fault or persistent dilatory 
tactics frustrating the judicial process." R.368. The Trial Court disagreed with 
Niculescu's contentions and for the reasons articulated in its Minute Entry denied his 
motion. R.518 (Exhibit "C" hereto). 
On appeal, Appellant does not challenge the Trial Court's rejection of his 
insufficiency, "bad faith" and "dilatory tactics" arguments. Instead, he now focuses 
exclusively on requests for admission, Rule 36, and cases interpreting Rule 36 to 
12There was a prior, contested, motion to compel filed November 9, 1999. R.249. 
However, as noted by the Court's May 19, 2001 Minute Entry, Niculescu never 
noticed this motion up for decision. R.518. 
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argue that the Court should have deemed his requests admitted, which "would have 
conclusively established many, if not all the facts necessary for the appellant to 
prevail." Brief at 14. Then he comes back to his argument that sanctions should have 
been imposed . . . and concludes that, "the Court clearly erred in denying the motion 
for sanctions." CCC responds as follows: 
First, a failure to timely respond to requests for admission (assuming that to 
be true) does not under Rule 36 warrant entry of a default judgment. The effect of a 
failure to timely respond within the time allowed is that the requests are deemed 
admitted. Utah R. Civ. P. 36(a). That is all. "Deemed admissions" are thus an effect 
of not responding in a timely fashion. A party should have the option and right to 
ignore requests for admission if, for example, the requests are not contested, or are 
innocuous and immaterial. Had CCC flat out ignored requests for admission, that 
would not by itself establish cause for entry of a default judgment. 
Second, CCC timely responded to Niculescu's January 27, 2000 Requests for 
Admission. Niculescu complains that his requests for admission: 
. . . served on January 27, 2000, were not responded to 
until at least February 28, some 32 days later . . . " 
Niculescu thus concludes that as CCC's responses appeared on the 32nd day, they 
therefore were past the 30 day due date prescribed by Rule 36(a)(1) and, thus, dire 
consequences should follow. Part of the problem is that Niculescu does not 
understand how the 30 day response date is calculated. Niculescu certified his 
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Requests for Admission as served by mail on January 27, 2000. R. 359. CCC 
responded February 28, 2000. See Certificate of Service at R.363 and CCC's 
responses at R.403, 418-421 (Exhibit "B" hereto). Rule 36(a)(1) gave CCC thirty 
days in which to respond to Niculescu's requests. Utah R. Civ. P. 6(e) gave it an 
additional three days, as Niculescu's requests were served by mail. CCC therefore 
had until February 29, 2000 to respond. Its response on February 28, 2000 was thus 
one day early! Consequently, the Requests for Admission cannot be deemed admitted 
by passage of time. See_ Minute Entry, R.518, 519 ("Chrysler Financial timely 
responded to plaintiffs second motion to compel and plaintiffs January Requests for 
Admission"). 
Third, Niculescu did not include his requests for admission the mandatory and 
cautionary notice required by the second sentence of Rule 36(a)(1). The failure to 
include in his requests this sentence, mandatory since 1986, should mean that requests 
will not be deemed admitted even if the response is untimely. See also Advisory 
Committee Note to Rule 36. 
Finally, even assuming that any of Niculescu's requests for admission should 
be deemed admitted, Niculescu never at any time offered them as proof: at trial (see 
Plaintiffs Trial Brief at R. 949); in opposition to CCC's pretrial motion for summary 
judgment, R. 713-721;13 or in support of his own motion for partial summary 
13CCC's motion is found at R. 576. Memoranda and supporting papers are found 
at R. 556 - 575, 579 - 671. CCC's motion was denied. R. 735 - 740. 
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judgment, R.142. Even if any of Niculescu's requests were to be deemed admitted, 
that did not relieve him of the necessity of introducing them as evidence. Massey v. 
Haupt. 632 P.2d 824, 825-825 (Utah 1981)14. A trial court cannot be faulted for its 
failure to consider "deemed admissions" in deducing findings of fact or in arriving at a 
judgment if an appellant did not put them into evidence. IcL at 826. 
Not only can a trial judge not be expected to take into account 
discovery material never adverted to, but, additionally, the party 
against which it is to be used has no opportunity to test its 
evidentiary competence, to illuminate its significance.. . 
* * * 
Discovery material on file but not called to the attention of the 
trial judge enjoys no better standing on appellate review than a 
motion filed but never presented, or evidence in possession or 
control of a party which was not introduced, [citations omitted]. 
In principle, attempting to argue the significance of material not 
before the court below is the same as arguing on appeal a point of 
law not raised before the trial judge. 
S. Kemble Fischer Realtv Trust v. Board of Appeals of Concord. 402 N.E.2d 100, 102 
(Mass. App. 1980) (referring to admissions generated by requests for admission). 
Even now, Appellant only vaguely asserts his opinion that there "were material facts 
that, if deemed admitted, would have conclusively established many, if not all of the 
facts necessary for the appellant to prevail." Brief at 14 (emphasis added). Appellant 
does not identify these "facts." Nor does he attempt to explain how these deemed 
"facts" would clearly negate the factual findings that the Trial Court made after receipt 
l4See also cases from other jurisdictions cited at Triple I Supply v. Sunset Rail 652 
P.2d 1298, 1300 n.5 (Utah 1982). 
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of evidence, when the evidence is marshalled in support of the findings that were 
made. In any event, his complaint of error is ill-founded where he never gave the trial 
court an opportunity to base its judgment on "facts" that he believes (rightly or 
wrongly) had been established via requests for admission. Bair v. Axiom Design, 
LLC, 20 P.3d 388, 395 (Utah 2001). 
V. There Exist No Grounds on which to Overrule the Trial Court's 
Findings on Malice/Intent to Injure. 
The Trial Court entered Findings of Fact opposed to Niculescu's theory of the 
case. R.862-870 (Exhibit "A" hereto). Findings of Fact relevant to Niculescu's claim 
of malice include the following: 
22. Chrysler Credit's report of a voluntary surrender was not the 
product of malice or ill will. 
24. There is no evidence that Chrysler Credit reported a voluntary 
surrender or repossession with an intent to harm Plaintiff. 
25. Chrysler Credit Corporation did not report erroneous credit 
information with an intention to harm Mr. Niculescu or his credit. 
26. Chrysler Credit followed normal and regular procedure in 
obtaining possession of the van following Plaintiffs default, 
giving Plaintiff notice of sale, and in notifying him of the 
deficiency that remained after sale of the van. 
Whether a person has acted with malice is, as Niculescu notes, a question of 
fact. See, Promax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247 (Utah App.), cert. 
38 
denied. 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). On the basis of the evidence before it, the Trial 
Court found that CCC's report of a repossession was not the product of malice, or an 
intention to harm Niculescu. 
According to Rule 52(a), Findings of Fact "shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous." Cornish Town v. Roller. 758 P.2d 919, 922 (Utah 1988). 
An appellant who wishes to successfully challenge a trial court's findings of 
fact must marshall all relevant evidence presented at trial that supports the Court's 
findings, Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), and then demonstrate why, even when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the trial court, it is insufficient to support the challenged 
finding. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989); Harker v. 
Condominiums Forest Glen. Inc.. 740 P.2d 1361 (Utah App. 1987). To establish clear 
error, "an appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,'..." In re Bartell. 776 P.2d 
885, 886 (Utah 1989). This burden "is a heavy one, reflective of the fact that [courts 
of appeal] do not sit to retry cases submitted on disputed facts." Id. at 886. When an 
appellant fails to carry his burden of marshaling the evidence, courts of appeal should 
"refuse to consider the merits of challenges to the findings and accept the findings as 
valid." Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale. 783 P.2d 551, 153 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
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Appellant makes no effort to marshal that evidence which would support the 
Court's Findings. All he does is repeat the generalized story and argument he made at 
trial and identify in a general sense, only, those "facts" that he says "are relevant in 
interpreting whether the respondent acted with malice, as defined by statute." Brief at 
17. An appellant who makes no effort to marshal facts in support of a court's finding 
cannot carry his burden on appeal to prove the finding is clearly erroneous. The 
analysis on appeal need not proceed past this point. West Valley City v. Majestic 
Development Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App.1991); Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, supra at 553. 
As noted supra at 26, the Trial Court adopted a less stringent standard of proof 
required to prove malice under 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) than that established by federal 
case law. Even though the Court perhaps set the bar lower than it should have, 
Niculescu still could not clear it. He could not prove that CCC's conduct was 
malicious. The Court's finding that there was no malice exhibited by CCC is not 
clearly erroneous. 
VI. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Plaintiffs Motion for 
Relief from Judgment and Objections to the Form of the Judgment. 
At the conclusion of trial, the Judge handed to CCC's counsel his edited copy 
of CCC's pretrial proposed Findings and directed that they be revised. Transcript of 
Hearing at 8; R.839-847 (shows Judge's edits). CCC's counsel did so and served 
Niculescu with proposed Findings of Fact by mail, on February 15, 2001. R.871. Per 
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Rule 4-504(2), Utah Code Judic. Admin., any objections to the form of the Order 
should have been made no later than February 23, 2001 (allowing an extra three days 
for service by mail). Thirteen days after the last day for objections had passed, on 
March 8th, Niculescu finally objected to the proposed Findings. Three days after 
that, on March 11th, the Court signed and entered Findings of Fact. R.862. The 
Judgment was later entered March 28, 2001. R.883. 
Niculescu thereafter sought to amend the Court's Findings of Fact, by way of a 
"Motion for Relief" filed April 24, 2001 (R.886); twenty-seven days after the 
judgment had been entered. However, he waited too long, as a motion to amend 
findings of fact must be filed within ten days after entry of judgment. Utah R.Civ.P. 
52(b); Bonneville Billing & Collection v. Torres. 15 P.3d 112, 114 (Utah App. 2000). 
Niculescu tried to evade the 10-day limitation by claiming his motion was brought 
pursuant to Rule 60(b). R 886. But in order for Rule 60(b) to warrant relief, the 
movant must show that there exists one or more of the reasons enumerated by Rule 
60(b) for avoiding or amending the judgment or order. Richins v. Delbert Chipman & 
Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382 (Utah App. 1991). Niculescu failed to identify any basis 
under Rule 60(b) that would warrant the relief the relief he requested. On that ground, 
also, his motion was correctly denied. Minute Entry (May 29, 2001) at R. 909; see 
also Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs "Motion for Relief," R. 
894-897. Furthermore, a Rule 60(b) motion cannot be used to extend the 10 days 
under Rule 52(b) in which to move for amendment of findings of fact. In re Bundv's 
Estate, 241 P.2d 462 (Utah 1952). 
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VII. The issue of CCC's Performance Under the 1992 Settlement 
Agreement Became Irrelevant and Immaterial Once Niculescu 
Elected to Rescind it and Revive his Original 1989 Complaint 
Niculescu's principal post judgment complaint with regard to the foregoing 
Findings was that they omitted any reference to the 1992 settlement agreement and 
damages caused by CCC's alleged breach of that agreement. Indeed, Appellant's 
Brief continues his tirade regarding the settlement agreement. As the Trial Court 
concluded, CCC's alleged nonperformance of the settlement agreement is immaterial 
given Niculescu's election to rescind the settlement agreement and revive his original 
Complaint. Transcript of Ruling at 4. Furthermore, the Exhibit (Plaintiff's Trial Exh. 
30) on which Niculescu bases this implied point of error was not received in evidence. 
R.856. 
Niculescu's motion to set aside the earlier dismissal and to reopen the case 
concluded that "plaitif[sic] is entitled to an Order, setting aside the settlement 
and judgment of dismissal.. . upon plaintiff tendering into court the consideration of 
$1,500 which he received in compromise settlement. . . "R. 123-124 [emphasis 
added]. Niculescu voluntarily disgorged the $1,500 settlement proceeds he had 
received.15 R.124. The resulting Order set aside the earlier settlement agreement and 
15Niculescu voluntarily tendered and paid into Court the $1,500 he had received in 
1992, so that he could rescind the settlement agreement and reopen the case. 
However, when CCC later tried to claim the $1,500, Niculescu tried to prevent it s 
release. See R.531-551, 687-689, 693-699. The Court released the money to 
CCC, concluding that Niculescu's election of remedy and his repudiation of the 
1992 settlement agreement required its disgorgement and its return to CCC. 
R.735-739, 748-751. 
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Order of Dismissal, per his request. 
An executory accord is a type of settlement agreement whereby a party accepts 
future performance by the other as consideration or partial consideration for his 
release of claims. Stratton v. West States Construction, 440 P.2d 117 (Utah 1968). 
When an executory accord is breached (or alleged to have been breached), the non-
breaching party has two choices: he may elect to recover damages for breach of the 
new obligation or he may elect to sue on the old one. Stratton. supra at 118. 
However, the non-breaching party must elect which of the two alternative remedies he 
wishes to pursue. He cannot have both. "A party to a settlement agreement cannot, 
on the other party's failure to perform, proceed on the original obligation and retain 
the benefit of the settling agreement." 15A C.J.S. Compromise & Settlement §46 
(1967). 
For better or for worse, Niculescu in 1997 elected to proceed on his original 
action. In so doing, he repudiated the 1992 settlement agreement. Having done so, he 
cannot now claim that the Trial Court should have awarded him damages for CCC's 
alleged breach of the settlement agreement. Nor should he be allowed to assert, as he 
does, that [alleged] breach of a repudiated settlement agreement establishes evidence 
of malice in connection with a report of repossession submitted half a decade earlier. 
- 4 3 -
VIII. Appellant's Exhibit "C" to his Brief is not Part of the Record on 
Appeal. 
Exhibit C to Appellant's Brief is not part of the Record. It was not introduced 
into evidence, nor did Niculescu try to introduce it into evidence. Furthermore, it 
purports to comment on prior practices of Chrysler Motor Corporation, which is a 
different company than was Chrysler Credit Corporation. It is not clear why Exhibit 
C is appended to Niculescu's Brief. In any event, it is of no relevance to the issues 
raised on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellee asks that the Court of Appeals affirm the Judgment of the Trial 
Court and dismiss the appeal. 
DATED this $A day of January, 2002. 
FISHBURN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
By: YIAJ ih—• 
P.Bryan Fishburn, Esq., Attorneys for 
Appellee Chrysler Financial Company, 
L.L.C., successor-in-interest to Chrysler 
Credit Corporation 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
Niculescu v. Chrysler Credit Corp. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
P. BRYAN FISHBURN, ESQ. (#A4572) 
GARY R. HOWE, ESQ. (#A1552) 
Gateway Tower East, Suite #900 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 530-7300 
Attorneys for Defendant Chrysler Financial Company, L.L.C., successor-in-interest to 
Defendant Chrysler Credit Corporation 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
ADRIAN NICULESCU, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HINCKLEY DODGE, a Utah 
corporation; and CHRYSLER MOTOR 
CORPORATION and CHRYSLER 
CREDIT CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 89090611£?£^ 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
* * * * * * * 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Having received the evidence presented at trial, the Court makes the following 
Findings of Fact: 
e / _ 
1. On or about March 11, 1987, Plaintiff purchased a 1987 Dodge B150 Van 
from Hinckley Dodge in Salt Lake City. 
2. Plaintiff did not have the financial ability to pay the purchase price in cash 
and thus borrowed the purchase price from Chrysler Credit Corporation. 
3. Chrysler Credit Corporation's financing of Plaintiffs purchase is 
documented by a Retail Installment Contract dated March 11, 1987. 
4. The Retail Installment Contract provides, among other things, that: 
a. Chrysler Credit financed $17,706.06 of Plaintiffs purchase (i.e., it 
loaned him that amount). 
b. Plaintiffs total payments over the course of his loan were to be 
$24,861.60, which he agreed to pay back over 5 years at $414.36 a 
month. 
c. Plaintiff gave the lender a security interest in the van (left-hand 
column, about one-third down from top of page; also Section A in 
lower left-hand corner). 
d. Plaintiff promised to repay the lender the amount it had financed 
according to the installment schedule stated in the contract. (Section 
A, lower left-corner). 
e. Plaintiff acknowledged that the Retail Installment Contract was to be 
assigned to Chrysler Credit. 
f. Plaintiff would be in default of his obligations under the contract if 
he failed to make payments as scheduled. 
g. In the event of Plaintiffs default, Chrysler Credit would have the 
right to repossess its collateral (Page 2 Section F) and apply the 
proceeds of its sale to reduce the amount of Plaintiffs debt (Page 2 
Section G). 
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h. Plaintiff signed the Agreement and thus, agreed to its terms. 
5. Although the Retail Installment Contract proclaimed the vehicle would be 
for personal and not commercial use, the Defendant knew the vehicle was to be used as a 
taxi. The dealer's employees were the Defendant's agent in improperly filling out the 
contract. 
6. Plaintiff knew when he purchased the van that it would be used for 
commercial purposes, as a taxi. He did not intend it to be for personal use. However, the 
Defendant also knew that Plaintiff intended to use the van as a taxi after purchase. 
7. On purchasing the van, Plaintiff immediately put it to commercial use as a 
taxi and made such alterations (including painting it red) necessary to adapt it to taxi 
services. 
8. Plaintiff says he experienced significant mechanical problems shortly after 
he purchased the van, although he did not prove it. He did not give Chrysler Motor 
Company a reasonable time to correct the alleged problems. 
9. With regard to the alleged problems concerning the van, Plaintiff sued 
Chrysler Motor Company, but not Chrysler Credit Corporation, in United States District 
Court in September 1987. Specifically, this prior action alleged breach of warranty, 
breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and negligent manufacture. No findings of 
fact were made in the Federal Court action, and there was no adjudication of the claims 
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therein raised because the lawsuit was settled and dismissed on payment to Plaintiff by 
Chrysler Motor Company of a modest sum certain. 
10. Plaintiffs United States District Court Complaint did not pray that 
Plaintiffs purchase be rescinded or set aside, or that he be relieved of his obligation to pay 
for the van, but instead sought damages of $250,000. 
11. Plaintiff made none of the monthly payments due Chrysler Credit under the 
Retail Installment Contract. 
12. Plaintiff repaid none of the $24,861.60 that the Retail Installment Contract 
obligated him to repay over time. 
13. About March 31 or April 1, 1987, after his purchase, Plaintiff returned the 
van to Hinckley and left it there. 
14. At the same time he returned the van to Hinckley, Plaintiff says he wrote 
Chrysler Credit Corporation and told it why he was giving back the van and why he 
intended to not make payments. However, the Pasadena post office address to which 
Plaintiff allegedly mailed his letter was a lock box intended only for the receipt of 
payments; not customer complaints. 
15. Chrysler Credit obtained possession of the van from Hinckley Dodge. 
16. Chrysler Credit notified Plaintiff that it was in possession of his van and 
intended to sell it at on or after May 29, 1987. 
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17. Chrysler Credit received no response from Plaintiff to the aforementioned 
notice. 
18. On June 29, 1987, Chrysler Credit wrote Plaintiff and provided him with an 
accounting following sale of his van. The letter reported a deficiency/balance due of 
$6,036.07. The letter invited Plaintiff to contact Chrysler Credit and work with it to re-
establish his credit. 
19. Plaintiff did not respond to Chrysler Credit's June 29, 1987 letter. 
20- In the normal course of its business, Chrysler Credit reported to a consumer 
reporting agency a "voluntary surrender." 
21. Chrysler Credit did not sue Plaintiff for the deficiency he still owed after the 
sale of his van. 
22. Chrysler Credit's report of a voluntary surrender was not the product of 
malice or ill will. 
23. The report of a "voluntary surrender" is functionally the same as a 
"repossession." There is little distinction between the two in terms of evaluating consumer 
credit. 
24. There is no evidence that Chrysler Credit reported a voluntary surrender or 
repossession with an intent to harm Plaintiff. 
25. Chrysler Credit Corporation did not report erroneous credit information with 
an intention to harm Mr. Niculescu or his credit. 
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26. Chrysler Credit followed normal and regular procedure in obtaining 
possession of the van following Plaintiffs default, giving Plaintiff notice of sale, and in 
notifying him of the deficiency that remained after sale of the van. 
27. About October, 1987, Plaintiff obtained a copy of his credit report. It 
showed that Chrysler Credit had reported a repossession. 
28. Plaintiff has not proved that the damages he claims were caused by Chrysler 
Credit's 1987 report of a "repossession." 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court enters the following conclusions of law: 
1. The Retail Installment Contract that Plaintiff signed on March 11, 1987 was 
a valid contract. 
2. Plaintiff breached his legal obligation under the Retail Installment Contract 
he signed in March 1987. He had failed to make the first monthly payment due under the 
contract and said he would not make payments. 
3. Plaintiffs post purchase return of the van to Hinckley Dodge, coupled with 
his failure to make satisfactory arrangements with Chrysler Credit regarding his installment 
debt and loan constituted an anticipatory repudiation by plaintiff of his obligations under 
the Retail Installment Contract. 
4. On Plaintiffs breach, Chrysler Credit was entitled by the terms of its 
contract and by the law, Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-503, to take possession of its collateral. 
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5. Having taken possession of its collateral on the Plaintiffs breach of 
contract, Chrysler Credit had a contractual right to sell the collateral and apply the net sale 
proceeds to his debt. See also Id. §70A-9-504 (secured party's right to dispose of collateral 
after default). 
6. Chrysler Credit's 1987 report to a consumer reporting agency was accurate. 
It was not "false," as Plaintiff claims. A voluntary surrender is a repossession. 
7. In order for Plaintiff to establish a cause of action for damages based on an 
allegedly erroneous credit report filed by Chrysler Credit Corporation, Plaintiff must prove 
by a preponderance of evidence that Chrysler Credit furnished erroneous information "with 
malice or willful intent to injure" the Plaintiff. 15 U.S.C. §1681h(e); Mitchell v. Surety 
Acceptance Corp.. 833 F.Supp. 497, 501 (D. Colo. 1993); Grant v. TRW. Inc.. 789 
F.Supp. 690, 693 (D. Md. 1992); Laracuente v. Laracuente> 599 A.2d 968, 971 
(N.J.Super. 1991). 
8. Chrysler Credit's report of a repossession was not motivated or produced by 
malice or a wilful intent to injure Plaintiff. 
9. Chrysler Credit, on purchase of the Retail Installment Sale contract from 
Hinckley Dodge became a holder-in-due course. Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-305. 
10. As a holder-in-due course, Chrysler Credit's rights under the Retail 
Installment Contract were and are not affected by defenses or claims that might have been 
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asserted against Chrysler Motor Company or Hinckley Dodge based on the condition of the 
vehicle. Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-305. 
11. Plaintiff has not proved that the damages he claims were caused by Chrysler 
Credit's 1987 report of a repossession. 
12. Plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages. On learning that Chrysler Credit 
had reported a repossession, Plaintiff had the right under federal law to explain his position 
to any credit reporting agency and insist that his written explanation of up to 100 words be 
included in any subsequent credit reports. 15 U.S.C. §1681i(b) & (c). Plaintiff did not, in 
the fourteen years since 1987, ever exercise this right Mto set the record straight." He 
never availed himself of the opportunity to explain to future creditors why he had not 
repaid his obligation to Chrysler Credit. 
13. Plaintiffs alleged letters were not reasonably calculated to reach anyone at 
Chrysler Credit involved in handling customer complaints. 
14. Chrysler Financial Company, as the successor-in-interest to Chrysler Credit 
Corp., is not liable to Plaintiff on the third cause of action pleaded by Plaintiff in his 
Complaint or on what remains of his first cause of action. 
15. Defendant is not entitled to recover attorneys fees from Plaintiff. Plaintiffs 
cause of action is not founded on the contract; thus there exists no contractual right to 
recover attorneys fees. 
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16. The Court does not find that Plaintiffs pursuit of this action was "not in 
good faith." Defendant therefore has not established a right to recover attorneys fees under 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56. 
DATED this day of. A/, / ., 2001. 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
Byj ^-
^y' Ju9gei^£ Cornaby 
9 
» >*r' 
pbf\30846M 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the following FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed, postage prepaid, on this / r day 
of February, 2001, to the following: 
Mark Besendorfer, Esq. 
942 East 7145 South, #A-102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
pbA308461-l 
- 1 0 -
EXHIBIT "B" 
Niculescu v. Chrysler Credit Corp. 
February 28, 2001 
Certificate of Service 
CCC's Response to Requests for Admission 
:, 
• i i 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
P. BRYAN FISHBURN, ESQ. (#A4572) 
Gateway Tower East, Suite #900 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 530-7300 
Attorneys for Defendant Chrysler Financial Company, L.L.C., successor-in-interest to 
Defendant Chrysler Credit Corporation 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * if 
ADRIAN NICULESCU, 
Plaintiff, 
j , vs. 
II 
! HINCKLEY DODGE, a Utah 
!! corporation; and CHRYSLER MOTOR 
!; CORPORATION and CHRYSLER 
' CREDIT CORPORATION, 
!i 
J I 
I! Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
0 
Civil No. 89090611CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
• i 
* * * * * * * 
This is to certify that on the sz Ik 'day of February, 2000, RESPONSES TO 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS, together with this CERTIFICATE 
OF SERVICE, were mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Mr. Adrian Niculescu 
470 South 1300 East, #309 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
DATED this "^ day of February, 2000. 
pbf\276969-l 
CALLKTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
By. **r>-
P. Bryan Fishbum, Esq., Attorneys for Defendant 
Chrysler Credit Corporation 
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CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
GARY R. HOWE, ESQ. (#A1552) 
P. BRYAN FISHBURN, ESQ. (#A4572) 
Gateway Tower East, Suite #900 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801)530-7300 
Attorneys for Defendant Chrysler Financial Company, L.L.C., successor-in-interest to 
Defendant Chrysler Credit Corporation 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
ADRIAN NICULESCU, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HINCKLEY DODGE, a Utah 
corporation; and CHRYSLER MOTOR 
CORPORATION and CHRYSLER 
CREDIT CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
! CHRYSLER FINANCIAL 
COMPANY'S RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSION 
? 
Civil No. 890906110CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
* * * * * * * 
I REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS 
j REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 1: Admit that after the transaction which 
I is the subject matter of this action was completed, you, or agents on your behalf, 
reported a negative credit transaction, to-wit, that the vehicle was reported as 
| repossessed and the loan was listed as a defaulted loan. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1: Denied. Chrysler 
!
 Credit, however, reported a repossession. 
( REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2; Admit that no independent verification 
! was made by you as to the reason for the alleged default on the loan in question and 
' alleged repossession of the vehicle. 
| RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2: Denied. Chrysler 
i 
; Credit reported a repossession because the loan was in default, which it verified. 
| REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 3: Admit that on or about March 31, 
i 
j 1987, you received written communication from the Plaintiff that the debt was disputed 
ji 
' and/or the vehicle had been returned voluntarily because it was defective. 
!« 
| | RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 3: Denied for the 
i [ 
, reason stated by Defendant's Answer to Interrogatory No. 6, dated 10-08-99. 
i 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 4: Admit that you did not report the debt 
i 
!
 as disputed after receiving the above notice. 
|i RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4: Denied for the 
reason stated by Defendant's Answer to Interrogatory No. 6, dated 10-08-99. It also 
would not have been Defendant's obligation to report the debt as disputed. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5: Admit that after the original settlement 
in this matter in 1992 which provided for, among other things, an agreement on your 
part to correct the credit history, no action was taken by you to correct the credit 
history and you continued to report the loan as a default and that the vehicle had been 
repossessed. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5: Denied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6: Admit that even after being served 
with this lawsuit in 1989, and even after the settlement in 1992, no action was taken by 
you to correct the credit history or report the debt as disputed. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6: Denied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7: Admit that the Plaintiff demanded that 
you comply with the terms of the settlement agreement several times since the 
agreement was entered into by way of personal and written communications with your 
counsel. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7: Defendant admits 
that the letter attached to Plaintiff's Requests was received by Chrysler Credit's 
attorney, Gary R. Howe. 
-3-
DATED this *7$ day of February, 2000. 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
IQ^JujJ.^ 
P. Bryan fishbum, Esq., Attorneys for Chrysler 
Financial Company, L.L.C. 
pbf\268487-l 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
Niculescu v. Chrysler Credit Corp. 
Court's Conclusion that CCC's 
February 28, 2001-Certificate of Service 
Response to Discovery Timely 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ADRIAN NICULESCU, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HINCKLEY DODGE, a Utah 
corporation; and CHRYSLER MOTOR 
CORPORATION and CHRYSLER CREDIT 
CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 890906110CV 
Honorable ANNE M. STIRBA 
Court Clerk: Marcy Thorne 
May 19, 2000 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
Specifically, on March 22, 2000, plaintiff filed a "Motion for 
Sanctions and to Enter Default." On March 30, 2000, defendant, 
Chrysler Financial Company, as a successor-in-interest to Chrysler 
Credit Corporation, filed their "Memorandum in Opposition to Motion 
for Sanctions and to Enter Default." On April 12, 2000, plaintiff 
filed its "Reply Regarding Motion for Sanctions and to Enter 
Default." The matter was submitted for decision on April 13, 2000. 
Neither party requested oral argument. 
The Court having considered the motion, memoranda and for the 
good cause shown hereby enters the following ruling. 
With this motion, plaintiff seeks an order of this Court 
deeming admitted plaintiff's requests for admission, striking 
Chrysler Financial's Answer and entering default against Chrysler 
Financial. Plaintiff bases this request upon what he alleges is 
Chrysler Financial's continual failure to respond to discovery. 
Chrysler Financial opposes the motion arguing it has timely 
responded to the orders of this Court, as well as subsequent 
discovery requests served by plaintiff. Accordingly, Chrysler 
Financial has done nothing to warrant sanctions or an entry of 
default. 
NICULESCU v. HINCKLEY DODGE PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
This action was filed in 1989. In 1992, the parties entered 
into a settlement agreement. As a result of this agreement, the 
Complaint was dismissed with prejudice in 1992. In 1997, plaintiff 
filed a motion to reopen the case, which was granted by this Court. 
On September 27, 1999, this Court entered a Minute Entry 
directing defendants to respond to plaintiff's previously filed 
Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents, and Requests 
for Admission, on or before October 8, 1999. According to the 
record, Chrysler Financial's response was dated and served October 
8, 1999. 
On November 8, 1999, plaintiff filed a Second Motion to 
Compel, asserting Chrysler Financial's October 8 response was not 
complete. Chrysler Financial opposed the motion by memorandum 
dated November 18, 1999, and supported by the Affidavit of Garry R. 
Howe. This motion was never submitted for decision and during this 
time, plaintiff's attorney withdrew from the case. 
On January, 27, 2000, plaintiff served defendant, by mail, a 
second set of Requests for Admission. Defendant served its 
response on February 28, 2000. 
Based upon the forgoing, it appears Chrysler Financial 
complied with the Court's Order to respond to previously filed 
discovery by October 8, 1999. Moreover, Chrysler Financial timely 
responded to plaintiff's second motion to compel1 and plaintiff's 
January Requests for Admission. Although plaintiff contends 
Defendants' Answers to Interrogatories are unresponsive, he does 
not specifically identify which answers are unresponsive or why he 
believes they are lacking. Finally, although Chrysler Financial 
admits not producing many documents in response to plaintiff's 
recent discovery request, according to the uncontorverted affidavit 
of Gary R. Howe, everything Chrysler Financial has to produce has 
been produced. 
Based upon the forgoing, there is no conduct on the part of 
Chrysler Financial that would warrant the granting of sanctions or 
the entry of default against Chrysler Financial. Accordingly, 
plaintiff's motion is respectfully, denied. 
1As noted, this motion was never submitted for decision. 
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DATED this day of May, 2000. 
BY THE COURT 
ANNE M. STIRI B
DISTRICT COURT 
EXHIBIT "D" 
Niculescu v. Chrysler Credit Corp. 
15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(qualified immunity) 
Ch. « 
CONSUMER CREDIT 
,
 r e s to consumer completely re-
~'~] °A nature and substance of derogato-
' alters in its report, was not estab-
^ • d by record indicating that agency 
" ^  t at every step to block consumer in 
At tempt to secure rights given to him 
"
:>
 this subchapter and that agency not 
" \ delayed and misled consumer on 
-Lion of his first request, but even did 
V
"on a second and third occasion. Mill-
*
 n, v O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., C.A.8 
X ) 1976, 528 F.2d 829. 
Failure of consumer reporting agency 
•o disclose nature and substance of all 
.nformation contained in its files con-
crnmg consumer who sought such infor-
mation, agency's forcing consumer to re-
urn to its offices on several occasions 
and attempting to withhold from consum-
er information that was rightfully due 
mm under this subchapter warranted im-
position of liabilities for violation of this 
Action. Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, 
Inc. E.D.Mo.1974, 383 F.Supp. 269, af-
firmed 528 F.2d 829. 
15 § 1681h 
Since this section requiring consumer 
reporting agency to disclose information 
to consumer is designed to protect con-
sumer, any request for information by a 
consumer concerning his file should re-
quire agency to report each of the three 
items of disclosure listed in this section. 
Equifax Services, Inc. v. Lamb, Ky.App. 
1981, 621 S.W.2d 28, certiorari denied 
102 S.Ct. 1973, 456 U.S. 927, 72 L.Ed.2d 
442. 
Consumer reporting agency complied 
with disclosure requirements under this 
section for consumer reports where all of 
the reports were disclosed to consumer, 
consumer was given copies of two of the 
reports and discovery taken during suit 
revealed no additional information which 
had not already been disclosed in a time-
ly fashion prior to the action being 
brought Equifax Services, Inc. v. Lamb, 
Ky.App.1981, 621 S.W.2d 28, certiorari 
denied 102 S.Ct 1973, 456 U.S. 927, 72 
L.Ed.2d 442. 
§ 1681 h . Conditions and form of disclosure to consumers 
(a) In general 
(1) Proper identification.—A consumer reporting agency shall re-
quire, as a condition of making the disclosures required under 
section 1681g of this tide, that the consumer furnish proper identifi-
cation. 
(2) Disclosure in writing.—Except as provided in subsection (b) of 
this section, the disclosures required to be made under section 
le>81(g) of this title shall be provided under that section in writing. 
(b) Other forms of disclosure 
(1) In general.—If authorized by a consumer, a consumer report-
ing agency may make the disclosures required under 1681g of this 
title-— 
(A) other than in writing; and 
(B) in such form as may be— 
(i) specified by the consumer in accordance with para-
graph (2); and 
(ii) available from the agency. 
(2) Form.—A consumer may specify pursuant to paragraph (1) 
l
*at disclosures under section 1681g of this tide shall be made— 
(A) in person, upon the appearance of the consumer at the 
place of business of the consumer reporting agency where disclo-
113 
15 §1681h COMMERCE AND TRADE Ch. 
sures are regularly provided, during normal business hours, and 
on reasonable notice; 
(B) by telephone, if the consumer has made a written request 
for disclosure by telephone; 
(C) by electronic means, if available from the agency; or 
(D) by any other reasonable means that is available from the 
agency. 
(c) Trained personnel 
Any consumer reporting agency shall provide trained personnel to 
explain to the consumer any information furnished to him pursuant 
to section 1681g of this title. 
(d) Persons accompanying consumer 
The consumer shall be permitted to be accompanied by one other 
person of his choosing, who shall furnish reasonable identification. 
A consumer reporting agency may require the consumer to furnish a 
written statement granting permission to the consumer reporting 
agency to discuss the consumer's file in such person's presence, 
(e) Limitation of liability 
Except as provided in sections 168In and I68I0 of this title, no 
consumer mav bring any action or proceeding in the nature of 
defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence wi{h respect to ifo 
reporting of information against any consumer reporting agency, any 
user of information, or any person who furnishes information to a 
consumer reporting agency, based on information disclosed pursuant 
to section 1681g, 1681h, or 1681m of this title, or based on informa-
tion disclosed by a user of a consumer report to or for a consumer 
against whom the user has taken adverse action, based in whole or in 
part on the report except as to false information furnished with 
malice or willful intent to injure such consumer. 
(Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, § 610, as added Pub.L. 91-508, Tide VI, § 601, Oct 
26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1131, and amended Pub.L. 104-208, Div. A, Tide II, 
§ 2408(e)(1), (e)(4), (e)(5)(B), Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-438, 3009-439.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports Amendments 
1968 Acts. House Report No. 1040 and 1996 Amendments. Section heading. 
Conference Report No. 1397, see 1968 Pub.L. 104-208, Div. A, Title II. 
U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. § 2408(e)(5)(B), Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat 
1962. 3009-439, inserted "and form" following 
"conditions". 
1970 Acts. House Report No. 91-975 Subsecs. (a), (b). Pub.L. 104-208, Div. 
and Conference Report No. 91-1587, see A. Tide II, § 2408(e)(1), Sept. 30, 1996, 
1970 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 110 Stat. 3009-438, revised subsecs. (a) 
4394. and (b). 
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